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Implementing U.S. Homeland Security Strategy is 
probably the most difficult challenge facing the U.S. 
today.  As a result of the Strategy, it is envisioned that 
many federal, state, local and private organizations will 
need to develop internal organizations for coordinating 
support with the Department of Homeland Security.  The 
organization that could potentially have the greatest 
impact on U.S. Homeland Security Strategy achievement is 
the Department of Defense.  Therefore, it is critical that 
the Department of Defense design an effective internal 
organization for supporting the U.S. Homeland Security 
Strategy and the Department of Homeland Security.  This 
thesis will analyze the Department of Defense’s initial 
efforts in developing its Homeland Security Support 
organization, and will evaluate its potential effectiveness 
for supporting the U.S. Homeland Security Strategy.  This 
thesis further seeks to provide a model for organizations 
to utilize in developing and diagnosing their homeland 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to assess the potential 
effectiveness of the Department of Defense Homeland 
Security Support organization through evaluation of its 
alignment with the U.S. Homeland Security Strategy and the 
proposed Department of Homeland Security. 
B. BACKGROUND 
The traditional view of U.S. homeland protection has 
always been to protect the U.S. homeland through engagement 
of military forces external to the U.S. borders.  However, 
September 11, 2001, awakened the U.S. to the reality of 
asymmetric threats and attacks directly on U.S. soil and 
within U.S. borders.  As a result, President George W. Bush 
believes that a new government structure is needed to 
better protect the U.S. from the “changing nature of the 
threat”. [Ref. 1] 
In June 2002, President Bush presented a formal 
proposal to Congress for the creation of the Department of 
Homeland Security.  Once approved, this new Cabinet-level 
agency would serve as the single focal point for U.S. 
homeland protection.  It consolidates the homeland security 
activities and functions currently spread over 22 other 
federal agencies, including activities within the 
Department of Defense.  Additionally in July 2002, 
President Bush published the first-ever National Strategy 
for U.S. Homeland Security, establishing a ‘road map’ for 
implementing U.S. Homeland Security strategy. 
  1
In the 2002 National Defense Authorization Act, the 
Department of Defense was directed to conduct a study on 
its role in homeland security and to develop a 
comprehensive plan that would provide for the most 
beneficial organization structures for supporting U. S. 
homeland security [Ref 2].  The challenge for the 
Department of Defense in developing new organization 
support structures stems from the fact that its traditional 
homeland security mission focuses on the protection of U.S. 
interests through engagement of military forces from 
abroad.  However, in supporting the U.S. Homeland Security 
Strategy, the Department of Defense would have the 
additional responsibility of providing domestic security 
support to the Department of Homeland Security. 
While the Department of Defense has always supported 
interagency cooperation such as with the U.S. Departments 
of State, Energy, Transportation, Justice, as well as with 
the federal intelligence agencies, no formal structure ever 
existed to facilitate this support.  In fulfilling the 
objectives of U.S. Homeland Security Strategy, the 
Department of Defense must now develop an internal 
organization that facilitates effective security support to 
the Department of Homeland Security. 
C. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The primary objective of this research is to answer 
the question: Will the Department of Defense’s Homeland 
Security Support Organization be effective in supporting 
the U.S. Homeland Security Strategy and objectives of the 
Department of Homeland Security?  And secondly, if it is 
determined to be effective, can the organization be modeled 
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and applied to other U.S. institutions involved with 
supporting U.S. Homeland Security Strategy implementation. 
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
In researching these objectives, I reviewed published 
materials, Congressional testimony, and current policy 
guidelines from the Internet related to U.S. Homeland 
Security.  The primary sources of my research included the 
National Strategy for Homeland Security, the Department of 
Homeland Security proposal, analysis and commentary from 
U.S. Homeland Security Institutions and organizations, and 
Department of Defense Homeland Security policy and 
guidelines.  Through examination of these materials I 
developed an organizational framework for the requirements 
for supporting U.S. Homeland Security Strategy and the 
Department of Homeland Security. 
I also conducted personal interviews and discussions 
with Department of Defense managers responsible for 
developing the Department of Defense Homeland Security 
Support Organization.  During the course of my research I 
conducted a telephone interview with Mr. Richard Burmood of 
the U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Task Force for Civil 
Support (JTF-CS) Planning representative, and gathered 
information from electronic mail communications with Major 
Mike Whetston of U.S. Joint Forces Headquarters – Homeland 
Security (JFHQ-HLS) and Major Ben Owens of the Office of 
the Assistant Secretary of Defense (OASD).  From Mr. 
Burmood’s interview I determined the role of the Joint Task 
Force organization in supporting U.S. Homeland Security 
efforts.  From communications with Major Whetston I 
obtained the Unified Military Command perspective in 
  3
supporting U.S. Homeland Security efforts.  Major Owens 
provided the Department of Defense policy perspective on 
supporting homeland security. 
Finally in order to analyze the Department of 
Defense’s Homeland Security Support organization and to 
evaluate its potential effectiveness for supporting U.S. 
Homeland Security Strategy, several alternative models for 
assessing organizational effectiveness were investigated.  
The model selected was Roberts’ Organization Systems 
Framework Model and Nadler and Tushman’s theory of 
congruence based on their ability to relate organizational 
effectiveness to strategy and organizational design. 
E. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Beginning in Chapter II, I will establish the 
foundation and requirement for a formal Department of 
Defense support organization through analysis of the 
National Strategy for Homeland Security and the proposed 
Department of Homeland Security Organization.  Next in 
Chapter III, I will provide an analysis of the Department 
of Defense’s Homeland Security policy and core support 
structure, and an evaluation of its congruence with U.S. 
Homeland Security Strategy utilizing Roberts’ OSF model, 
and finally in Chapter IV, I will provide a summary, 
conclusions, and final recommendations of findings. 
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II. U.S. HOMELAND SECURITY 
A. U.S. HOMELAND SECURITY STRATEGY 
1. Key Policy Actions Leading to the Formation of 
U.S. Homeland Security Strategy 
Figure 1 depicts some of the key policy actions 
leading up to the formation of the first-ever U.S. National 
Strategy for Homeland Security.  This by no means is an 
exhaustive list of all the actions taken following the 
attack on America.  However, these specific actions 
highlight the need for establishing formal linking 
organizations and management structures to support the new 
U.S. Homeland Security Strategy.  It also reveals early 
efforts by the Department of Defense to establish its 
Homeland Security support structures. 
 
Sep 11, 2001 America attacked 
Sep 20, 2001 President Bush announces creation of 
White House office of Homeland Security 
and appoints Pennsylvania Governor Tom 
Ridge as Director. 
Sep 24, 2001 2002 National Defense Authorization Act 
calls for the Department of Defense to 
conduct a study on its role in homeland 
security and to develop a comprehensive 
plan that provides for the most 
beneficial organization structures for 
supporting U. S. homeland security 
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Oct 2, 2001 Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld announces 
Secretary of the Army, Thomas E. White 
as Department of Defense’s executive 
agent for homeland security 
Oct 8, 2001 President Bush swears-in Governor Ridge 
as Assistant to the President for 
Homeland Security, and issues Executive 
Order creating Office of Homeland 
Security 
Oct 16, 2001 President issues Executive Order 
establishing the President’s Critical 
Infrastructure Protection Board to 
coordinate and have cognizance of 
Federal efforts and programs that 
relate to protection of information 
systems 
Oct 29, 2001 President Bush issues directive 
establishing the organization and 
operation of the Homeland Security 
Council 
Apr 17, 2002 Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld announces 
2002 Unified Command Plan realigning 
U.S. military structure and creating 
the U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) 
Jun 6, 2002 President Bush proposes creation of 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
Jun 6, 2002 Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld issues 
statement of support for the Department 
of Homeland Security 
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June 2002 Department of Defense proposes creation 
of the Office of Homeland Defense 
Policy and Department of Defense Office 
of Intelligence 
Jul 16, 2002 President Bush creates the first-ever 
U.S. National Strategy for Homeland 
Security 
Figure 1.   Key Policy Actions Leading to the 
Formation of U.S. Homeland Security Strategy 
[After Ref. 1:pp. 19-24] 
 
Almost immediately following the September 11 attack, 
President Bush established the White House office of 
Homeland Security and appointed Pennsylvania Governor Tom 
Ridge as its Director.  Around this same time, the 2002 
National Defense Authorization Act was signed.  In its 
final version the Department of Defense was tasked to 
conduct a study on its role in homeland security and to 
develop a comprehensive plan which would provide for the 
most beneficial organization structures for supporting U. 
S. homeland security. 
On October 2, 2001, the Secretary of the Army, Thomas 
E. White, was designated as the Department of Defense’s 
executive agent for homeland security matters, signaling 
the Department of Defense’s efforts to make homeland 
defense a top priority.  During this same month President 
Bush issued executive orders establishing both the U.S. 
Critical Infrastructure Protection Board and the Homeland 
Security Council (HSC). 
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The HSC was established in order to serve as the 
overall coordinating body for U.S. Homeland Security 
strategy, similar to the role the National Security Council 
(NSC) plays as Defense policy coordinator.  Accordingly, 
current plans call for the Department of Defense to 
maintain representation on both the NSC and HSC. [Ref.3] 
On April 17, 2002, the Department of Defense revised 
its Unified Command Plan (UCP).  UCP(02) was developed in 
order to realign the military Unified Command Structure.  
Among the key changes in UCP02 was the establishment of the 
U.S. Northern Command or USNORTHCOM.  Effective October 1, 
2002, USNORTHCOM will be responsible for U.S. Homeland 
Defense, placing the homeland security missions previously 
performed by the various other combatant commanders under a 
single command.  Additionally, USNORTHCOM will be 
responsible for coordinating all requirements for military 
support to civil authorities, which currently is the 
responsibility of the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) and its 
Joint Task Force organization. [Ref. 2] 
On June 6, 2002, President Bush proposed creation of 
the Department of Homeland Security.  The President’s 
proposal outlines the mission, organization, and functions 
of the new department, and highlights key consolidation 
efforts.  However, the proposal does not provide an 
overarching strategy for U.S. Homeland Security. 
Immediately following this announcement the Secretary 
of Defense issued his statement of support for the proposed 
organization, and announced his proposals for establishing 
the Office of Homeland Defense Policy and the Department of 
Defense Office of Intelligence. 
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Finally, on July 16, 2002, the first-ever national 
strategy for U.S. Homeland Security was announced.  Thus, 
the foundation for strategy implementation was initiated 
and the need for federal, state, local, and private agency 
cooperation and support in implementing U.S. Homeland 
Security strategy was established. 
2. Analysis of U.S. Strategy for Homeland Security 
In his opening letter to the U.S. Strategy for 
Homeland Security, President Bush outlines his purpose and 
intent for developing this new strategy.  It is important, 
as he writes, for all Americans to understand that “[t]his 
is a national strategy, not a federal strategy”.  In other 
words this is not simply some top-down federal policy, but 
a strategy that requires participation and cooperation by 
all Americans and throughout all levels of American 
society.  Furthermore, it is hoped that from this 
overarching strategy mutually supporting state, local, and 
private sector strategies will emerge. [Ref. 3] 
In presenting this strategy the President seeks to 
answer four basic questions: 
1) What is “homeland security” and what missions does 
it entail? 
2) What are the most important goals of homeland 
security? 
3) What is the federal executive branch doing now to 
accomplish these goals and what should it do in the 
future?, and 
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4) What should non-federal governments, the private 
sector, and citizens do to help secure the homeland? [Ref. 
3] 
President Bush ends his opening statement by 
emphasizing that this strategy is just the beginning and 
will be evolutionary and dynamic process. [Ref. 3]  
Consequently the strategy can only be judged on how well it 
addresses these four questions. 
One of the top organizations in the field of U.S. 
National and Homeland Security is the Advanced National 
Strategy and Enabling Results (ANSER) Institute for 
Homeland Security.  Originally chartered in California with 
the assistance of the RAND Corporation in 1958, ANSER 
became one of nine Federal Contract Research Centers (FCRC) 
serving a single Department of Defense client – the Air 
Force Director of Development Planning (later named Deputy 
Chief of Staff/Research and Development).  After dropping 
the FCRC designation in 1976, ANSER began working for 
numerous Air Force organizations, other Department of 
Defense components, and other federal agencies.  In April 
2001, the ANSER Institute for Homeland Security was 
formally established to provide consultancy and research 
services in the area of homeland security.  The ANSER 
Institute for Homeland Security currently leads the debate 
on U.S. Homeland Security through executive-level 
education, public awareness programs, workshops for policy 
makers and online publications.  Many of their key 
personnel and board of advisors include former senior-
ranking military officers and leaders, including Dr. John 
Hamre and Admiral Harold W. Gehman Jr., USN (retired). 
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On July 19, 2002, ANSER provided a concise analysis on 
the U.S. Homeland Security Strategy entitled “The National 
Strategy for Homeland Security:  Finding the Path Among the 
Trees”.  ANSER concludes in its final assessment that the 
Strategy does in fact achieve its intended purpose, and by 
answering the four questions posed by the President in his 
opening statement, provides a useful framework for 
understanding “what must be done, who must do it, and what 
actions are required to get started”.  ANSER frames its 
analysis by identifying four key themes within the strategy 
that provide direction to the Nation for strategy 
implementation: Federalism, Accountability, Fiscal 
Responsibility, and Prioritization of Effort. [Ref. 5] 
a. Federalism 
The first important theme is Federalism: “the 
idea that the federal government shares authority, 
responsibility, the mandate for action, and the struggle 
for resources with state and local governments and private 
sectors”. [Ref. 6]  This statement promotes the idea of 
partnership as opposed to federal government control, and 
establishes the need for interagency cooperation and 
coordination between all federal, state, local, and private 
sector organizations, and specifically the need to develop 
linking organizations and liaisons with other federal and 
non-federal agencies. 
However this theme does not imply abrogation of 
the federal government’s leadership role.  In fact, it 
assumes the approval of the proposed Department of Homeland 
Security (which will be discussed in the following section) 
as the central coordinating agency for U.S. Homeland 
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security [Ref. 6].  Furthermore, in keeping with the Tenth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution which ensures the rights 
of states in retaining their independent power and 
authority, Federalism promotes the idea that programs below 
the national level are merely “suggestions” and “not 
mandates”.  It implies that efforts should be made to 
consolidate plans where possible, and organizations should 
seek to fill in “the gaps” in programs in order to reduce 
U.S. vulnerabilities [Ref. 7]. 
b. Accountability 
A second theme is Accountability: that all U.S. 
homeland security – related programs must be measurable, 
show results, and that individuals be held responsible for 
the results [Ref. 8].  This theme addresses the importance 
of applying management control to homeland security 
programs.  In order to evaluate the overall effectiveness 
of the U.S. Homeland Security Strategy, management controls 
will need to be established in order to measure performance 
and results.  It will therefore be critical for management 
control functions to be designed into all homeland 
security-related programs and organizations. 
c. Fiscal Responsibility 
A third theme, closely related to Accountability, 
is Fiscal Responsibility.  As the Strategy states, 
“Government should fund only those homeland security 
activities that are not supplied, or are inadequately 
supplied, in the market”. [Ref. 9]  This sends a clear 
message that it is not the federal government’s intentions 
to build or finance additional programs where they already 
exist, whether within the federal, state, local government, 
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or private sector, but instead to seek consolidation and 
integration of these programs. 
d. Prioritization 
And the final theme is Prioritization of effort, 
not from a strictly budgetary standpoint (which is the 
typical method used by the federal government in 
prioritizing federal programs), but instead from a 
strategic standpoint.  Without regard to budgetary or 
resource constraints, six initiatives, or critical mission 
areas were established early on as the top priorities for 
the Department of U.S. Homeland Security: 
Intelligence and Warning 
Border and Transportation Security 
Domestic Counter terrorism 
Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets 
Defending Against Catastrophic Threats 
Emergency Preparedness and Response [Ref. 10]. 
The net objective of these themes or strategic 
issues is to create an organization that is responsive and 
therefore capable of effectively managing U.S. homeland 
security efforts. 
ANSER additionally addressed issues that they 
felt were missing from the Strategy.  Two of these issues 
were: How to centralize budgeting issues related to 
homeland security; and How to better ‘marry’ intelligence 
to law enforcement. These could potentially impact 
Department of Defense policy and the design of its 
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organization structure for supporting the proposed 
Department of Homeland Security. [Ref. 11] 
The issue of centralizing budgeting issues 
related to homeland security was first raised during a May 
7, 2002 hearing before the Senate Appropriations Committee 
on Homeland Security with the Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld testifying.  During this hearing Senator Pete V. 
Domenici (R-New Mexico) commented “…I would just observe 
that one of the most difficult problems that I think the 
appropriators are going to end up having is distinguishing 
what functions are homeland defense and what functions are 
defense…when we put our bills together, how do we know that 
the distinction between that which is defense and that 
which is homeland security is what we would think?” [Ref. 
2] 
The concern Senator Domenici is expressing is the 
potential for crossover or duplication of missions and 
budgets.  ANSER rightly noted this as a key factor missing 
from the Strategy, which could be potentially challenging 
for the Department of Defense as it seeks to define its 
role in Homeland Security. 
For the second issue of ‘marrying’ intelligence 
with law enforcement, the Strategy does acknowledge the 
need for improved integration.  However it does not provide 
any specific solutions.  In the area of “intelligence” 
alone, major improvements are necessary.  While it is clear 
that military intelligence plays a vital role in homeland 
security, intelligence within the Department of Defense, 
and throughout the U.S. for that matter, remains 
essentially fragmented and dispersed without much effort of 
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consolidation.  As the Strategy recognizes this need to 
better ‘marry’ intelligence with law enforcement, the 
Department of Defense must carefully consider this issue 
when designing its homeland security support organization. 
Through the four themes of Federalism, 
Accountability, Fiscal Responsibility, and Prioritization 
of Effort, the U.S. Strategy for Homeland Security seeks to 
provide a ‘road map’ for strategy implementation that 
produces both a responsive and responsible organization.  
Under the concept of Federalism the Strategy calls for a 
‘partnership’ effort by federal, state, local, and private 
organizations.  However, the plan establishes the federal 
government as the lead organization for coordinating and 
managing this effort.  The Department of Homeland Security 
was proposed in order to fulfill this purpose as well as to 
try and achieve operational efficiency through 
consolidation and integration of homeland security 
functions. 
 
B. THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
1. The Proposed Organization, Mission, and Functions 
As proposed under the 2002 Homeland Security Act, the 
primary mission of the Department of Homeland Security is 
to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, 
reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, and to 
minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur 
[Ref. 12].  The primary mission is further divided into the 
six critical mission areas that were mentioned in the 
previous section, including: Intelligence and Warning, 
Border and Transportation Security, Domestic Counter 
  15
terrorism, Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Key 
Assets, Defending Against Catastrophic Threats, and 
Emergency Preparedness and Response.  In order to 
accomplish these mission areas four functional divisions 
were established within the Department: 
Border and Transportation Security 
Emergency Preparedness and Response 
Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear 
Countermeasures 
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection 
(see Figure 2 below). 
 
Figure 2.   Organization of the Department of 
Homeland Security [From Ref. 1:p. 9] 
 
First, under Border and Transportation Security, the 
Department would be responsible for all security operations 
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related to U.S. borders, territorial waters, and 
transportation systems.  They would be required to unify 
and assume responsibility for the operational assets of all 
federal agencies previously responsible for these 
activities including the Coast Guard, Customs Service, 
Immigration and Naturalization Service and Border Patrol, 
the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service of the 
Department of Agriculture and the recently created 
Transportation Security Administration [Ref. 13]. 
For the second division, Emergency Preparedness and 
Response, the Department would be responsible for federal 
emergency management including domestic disaster 
preparedness and response, the training of first 
responders, and the administration of grant programs for 
firefighters, police, and emergency personnel. The Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and all its functions 
and operations would be incorporated under this division.  
This division would be responsible for integrating all 
federal interagency response plans into a single, 
comprehensive, government-wide federal response plan. [Ref. 
13] 
The Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 
(CBRN) Countermeasures Division within the Department would 
be responsible for preparing for and responding to all 
threats involving weapons of mass destruction.  Through 
this division national policy and state and local 
guidelines would be established, as well as drills and 
exercises directed in order to prepare for a CBRN attack. 
[Ref. 13] 
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Finally, the Information Analysis and Infrastructure 
Protection Division of the Department would be responsible 
for analyzing and fusing together all homeland threat-
related intelligence as gathered from the various federal, 
state, local, and civil intelligence organizations.  This 
division would also be responsible for evaluating and 
assessing vulnerabilities in order to better protect U.S. 
critical infrastructure including “food and water systems, 
agriculture, health systems and emergency services, 
information and telecommunications, banking and finance, 
energy, transportation, chemical and defense industries, 
postal and shipping entities, and national monuments and 
icons”. [Ref. 14] 
Two other key divisions that would report directly to 
the Department Secretary include a State, Local, and 
Private Sector coordination division.  This division would 
be responsible for streamlining and coordinating federal 
homeland security programs with state, local, and private 
sector officials, and providing these organizations with a 
single liaison or point of contact. [Ref. 14]  The other 
division that would report directly to the Department 
Secretary is the Secret Service.  The Secret Service would 
continue its primary mission of protecting the President 
and other government leaders.  However, it would be 
incorporated under the Department of Homeland Security in 
order to provide security for designated national events. 
[Ref. 14] 
The proposal also calls for the original Office of 
Homeland Security and Homeland Security Council to remain 
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as an advisory and coordinating body to the President, 
equivalent to the National Security Council. [Ref. 14] 
On June 27, 2002, the ANSER Institute conducted an 
analysis of the proposed Department of Homeland Security 
organization, summarizing the strengths and weaknesses and 
key points of the proposal, as well as highlighting key 
implications of the organizations design. 
2. Strengths, Weaknesses, and Implications for the 
Department of Defense 
According to ANSER, the strengths of the proposed 
organization include: 
1) Unity of command through the establishment of 
reporting authority to a single individual and a single 
organization. 
2) Visibility and connectivity to all major homeland 
security issues. 
3) A framework for assimilating and synthesizing 
homeland security – related intelligence under the 
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection division 
4) A framework for Congressional oversight of Homeland 
Security programs and costs. 
5) A single public voice for communicating U.S. 
Homeland Security matters. 
6) Uniformity, cooperation, and organizational synergy 
through consolidation and integration of programs. 
7) Clear responsibility for the management and 
utilization of national resources for crisis management and 
response. 
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8) A single point of contact for state, local, and 
private sector. 
9) A solid organizational foundation in which to 
develop unifying plans, guidelines, and strategy. [Ref. 15] 
ANSER also identified two key weaknesses of the 
proposal that have implications for other federal agencies 
involved with homeland security, but particularly the 
Department of Defense.  They include: 
1) The lack of focus on developing support 
organizations.  As ANSER noted “the experience of every 
existing agency (to include the Department of Defense, the 
new department’s closest cousin) indicates that a number of 
supporting offices must be created to develop the 
Secretary’s priorities and messages (both internally and 
externally)”. 
2) The lack of identifying and defining relationships 
with other key organizations including the Department of 
Defense and the National Guard who according to ANSER “are 
large enough to foil the entire plan just by developing 
their own plans independently”. [Ref. 15] 
Furthermore, the proposal requires the Department of 
Defense to have to realign certain activities as well as 
transfer other activities to the Department of Homeland 
Security. 
First, The Department of Defense, through the Navy and 
through the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) Joint Task Force 6 
(JTF-6), has historically played a key role in providing 
counter-drug operations support to the Coast Guard.  
However, since the Coast Guard is placed under the 
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Department of Homeland Security in the new proposal [Ref. 
13], the Department of Defense would have to realign its 
drug operations support mission with the Department of 
Homeland Security under its Border and Transportation 
Security Division.  This issue relates back to the concern 
posed by Senator Domenici over the potential duplication of 
missions and budgets, and the need to define and 
distinguish between an organization’s traditional mission 
and homeland security support. 
Second, under Emergency Preparedness and Response, the 
Department of Defense, through JFCOM’s Joint Task Force for 
Civil Support (JTF-CS), currently coordinates military 
support to civil authorities directly with other federal 
agencies, but primarily with FEMA.  Since FEMA would fall 
under the Department of Homeland Security in the new 
proposal [Ref. 13], the Department of Defense would have to 
realign its military activities support mission directly 
with the Department of Homeland Security. 
Third, under Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and 
Nuclear Countermeasures, the Department of Defense has 
included in the President’s FY03 budget a $420 million 
proposal for development of the National Bioweapons Defense 
Analysis Center.  If it is approved it would have to be 
transferred to the Department of Homeland Security. [Ref. 
2] 
Last, under Information Analysis and Critical 
Infrastructure Protection, the Department of Defense would 
transfer its responsibility for the U.S. National 
Communications System to the Department of Homeland 
Security [Ref. 1]. 
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In order to support the U.S. Homeland Security 
Strategy, the Department of Defense established initial 
policy guidance and began developing its internal support 
organization.  The next chapter will provide an analysis of 
both the Department of Defense’s Homeland Security policy 
and support organization, and provide an evaluation of its 
alignment with the objectives, strategic issues, strengths 
and weaknesses of the U.S. Homeland Security Strategy and 
proposed Department of Homeland Security. 
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III. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HOMELAND SECURITY 
A. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HOMELAND SECURITY POLICY 
Under the 2002 National Defense Authorization Act, the 
Department of Defense was directed to conduct a study on 
its role in homeland security as well as to develop plans 
for providing the most beneficial organization structures 
for supporting U.S. homeland security.  In addressing the 
Department of Defense’s role in homeland security, the 
Secretary of Defense in testimony before the Senate 
Appropriations Committee on May 7, 2002, provided general 
guidelines in establishing the foundation for Department of 
Defense policy relating to U.S. Homeland Security support.  
Later this testimony was developed into a prepared 
statement of Department of Defense policy which was 
presented before the House of Representatives Armed 
Services Committee on June 26, 2002 by Principal Deputy 
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Dr. Stephen Cambone. 
In establishing Department of Defense Homeland 
Security policy, Secretary Rumsfeld sought first to make 
the distinction between defense functions and homeland 
security functions.  He defined homeland security as “a 
concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks 
within the United States, reduce the vulnerability of the 
United States to terrorism, and minimize the damage and 
assist in the recovery from terrorist attacks”.  He then 
defined homeland defense as “the protection of United 
States territory, domestic population, and critical defense 
infrastructure against external threats and aggression”. 
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With respect to homeland security, Secretary Rumsfeld 
stated that the Department of Defense would operate in 
support of a lead federal agent, and with respect to 
homeland defense, the Department of Defense would take the 
lead and be supported by other federal agencies.  For 
further clarification the Secretary provides three 
situations or circumstances in which military forces would 
be employed: Extraordinary, Emergency, and Limited Scope or 
Duration. [Ref. 2] 
Extraordinary circumstances are those situations that 
would require the Department of Defense to execute its 
traditional military missions of deterrence or defeat of an 
attack from an external threat.  Extraordinary 
circumstances fall under the category of homeland defense, 
which means that the Department of Defense would take the 
lead role and would be supported by other federal entities.  
Under the U.S. Homeland Security Strategy and proposed 
Department of Homeland Security organization planning would 
be coordinated, as appropriate, through the National 
Security Council, Homeland Security Council, Department of 
Homeland Security, and other affected federal agencies. 
[Ref. 2] 
Emergency circumstances are those situations that are 
of a catastrophic nature and national significance such as 
responding to a WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction) attack or 
assisting in response to natural disasters such as forest 
fires, floods, hurricanes, tornadoes, etc.  Emergency 
circumstances fall under the category of homeland security, 
which means that the Department of Homeland Security would 
have the responsibility for coordinating the response of 
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federal agencies and, as appropriate, the interactions 
between those agencies and state and local organizations.  
The Department of Defense would play a supportive role and, 
through the interagency process, provide the necessary 
resources and capabilities needed to augment or support a 
coordinated effort. [Ref. 2] 
Events of limited scope or duration include providing 
support for special events or missions as directed or 
assigned by the President.  Similar to Emergencies, the 
Department of Defense would play a supportive role and 
through the interagency process, provide the necessary 
resources and capabilities needed to augment or support a 
coordinated effort.  An example of this is security support 
for the recent Olympic Games in Salt Lake City. [Ref. 2] 
It is important to note that under the Department of 
Defense’s Homeland Security policy no violation or change 
in Posse Comitatus (the federal law which prohibits active 
duty military forces, excluding the National Guard when not 
in federal service, from engaging in domestic law 
enforcement activities) is envisioned. [Ref. 2] Under 
Presidential Decision Directives PDD 39, U.S. Policy on 
Counterterrorism and related directive PDD 62, and as 
authorized and requested by the President, military forces 
may be employed in response to acts or threats of domestic 
terrorism, and all requests for assistance in responding to 
acts or threats of domestic terrorism must be approved by 
the Secretary of Defense [Ref. 16].  Also the Department of 
Defense currently maintains policies on the authorized use 
of military forces in providing Crisis Management and 
Consequence Management during civil emergencies.  Policy 
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relating to Crisis management is primarily addressed in 
Department of Defense directives 3025.15, Military 
Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA) and 3025.12, 
Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances (MACDIS), and 
policies relating to Consequence management are covered in 
Department of Defense directive 3025.1, Military Support to 
Civil Authorities (MSCA) [Ref. 16]. 
In addition to establishing these initial policy 
guidelines, the Department of Defense began to establish 
its Homeland Security Support organization by initiating 
three internal structural changes:  1) Reform of the 
Department of Defense Unified Military Command Structure, 
2) Proposal for the establishment of the Department of 
Defense Office of Homeland Defense, and 3) Proposal for the 
establishment of the Department of Defense Office of 
Intelligence.  These three restructuring initiatives 
combined to form the core foundational structure for the 
Department of Defense’s Homeland Security Support 
Organization.  These will be discussed in detail in the 
following section. 
B. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HOMELAND SECURITY SUPPORT 
1. Department of Defense Core Homeland Security 
Support Organization 
Figure 3 below depicts the Department of Defense’s 
core Homeland Security Support Organization.  The 
Department of Defense’s first major initiative in 
developing its Homeland Security support organization was 
to revise the Unified Command Plan and realign the U.S. 
military command structure. 
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Figure 3.   The Department of Defense Core Homeland 
Security Support Organization 
 
Under the 2002 Unified Command Plan (UCP02), the U.S. 
Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) was created and given 
responsibility for U.S. Homeland Defense and U.S. Homeland 
Security support missions.  Joint Forces Headquarters 
Homeland Security (JFHQ-HLS), which previously belonged to 
the U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), was reassigned to 
USNORTHCOM.  JFHQ-HLS is responsible for coordinating the 
land and sea defense of the U.S. and is the liaison for 
military activities support to civil authorities.  Two key 
subordinate units of JFHQ-HLS will also transfer to 
USNORTHCOM, the Joint Task Force – Civil Support (JTF-CS) 
and the Joint Task Force – 6 (JTF-6). [Ref. 17] 
JTF-CS was created as a result of UCP99 in October 
1999 to provide command and control consequence management 
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for Department of Defense forces deployed in the aftermath 
of a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear or High-
yield Explosive (CBRNE) incident [Ref. 18].  However, with 
the establishment of USNORTHCOM and the subsequent 
realignment of activities and missions, it is envisioned 
that JTF-CS’s mission will be expanded to include providing 
military activities support to lead civilian agencies for 
other incidents or crisis related to U.S. Homeland Security 
[Ref. 19].  Under the envisioned Department of Defense core 
Homeland Security Support Organization, the JTF-CS 
organization would be aligned in supporting the proposed 
Department of Homeland Security under its Emergency 
Preparedness and Response mission area. 
Since 1989 JTF-6 has played a key role in providing 
counter-drug operations support to the Coast Guard as well 
as other federal, regional, state, and local law 
enforcement agencies.  Their future role and mission under 
the new structure is still undetermined.  Under their 
current mission they would be aligned in supporting the 
proposed Department of Homeland Security under its Border 
and Transportation Security mission area. [Ref. 17] 
Additionally, USNORTHCOM will have authority over the 
employment of the National Guard while they are under Title 
X status (federalized).  The role and mission of the 
National Guard under the envisioned Department of Defense 
Homeland Security Support Organization is also still not 
yet fully developed.  The current Department of Defense 
perspective is for authority over the Guards’ activities to 
remain primarily a state function. [Ref. 4] 
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It is also important to note that under the Department 
of Defense’s envisioned Homeland Security Support 
Organization, USNORTHCOM is only authorized to coordinate 
its homeland security support efforts through the internal 
Department of Defense organization and not directly with 
the Department of Homeland Security [Ref. 17].  The Joint 
Task Force (JTF) organizations (JTF-CS and JTF-6), in 
implementing the strategy set forth by USNORTHCOM, will 
provide direct support to the Department of Homeland 
Security under the respective Homeland Security mission 
areas. 
The Department of Defense’s second key initiative was 
to propose creation of the Office of Homeland Defense 
Policy within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and 
for a new Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland 
Policy.  This office would be responsible for ensuring 
internal coordination of Department of Defense policy, 
developing strategic planning, force employment, and civil 
support - related guidance, providing guidance to 
USNORTHCOM for its homeland defense and homeland security 
support mission, and providing coordination with the Office 
of Homeland Security, the Department of Homeland Security, 
and other government agencies. [Ref 2] 
Finally, the Department of Defense’s third initiative 
was to propose creation of a Department of Defense Office 
of Intelligence and for an Under Secretary of Defense for 
Intelligence.  This office would seek to enhance Department 
of Defense intelligence-related activities and provide a 
single point of contact for coordinating national and 
military intelligence activities with the Director of 
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Central Intelligence and the Department of Homeland 
Security. [Ref. 2] 
The effectiveness of the Department of Defense 
Homeland Security support organization will ultimately be 
determined based on how well it supports the new Department 
of Homeland Security in achieving the U.S. Homeland 
Security Strategy.  However, since the Department of 
Homeland Security has not yet been approved, the outcomes 
and results of the new organization and U.S. Homeland 
Security Strategy cannot yet be measured.   
According to Nadler and Tushman, authors of 
Organization Design, a more critical measurement of 
effectiveness is the alignment or congruence of an 
organization’s components [Ref. 20].  Under the systems 
view of organizations, congruence can be defined as the 
degree to which an organization’s components fit together 
[Ref. 20].  The components of an organization are its 
inputs, throughput or transformational processes, and its 
results or outputs. The basic hypothesis of the congruence 
theory is that the greater the degree of congruence or fit 
among an organization’s components, the more effective the 
organization will be in achieving its intended strategy 
[Ref. 20]. 
Organizational effectiveness is defined as the degree 
in which an organization’s actual outcomes or results are 
similar to its expected results, as specified from its 
strategy [Ref. 20].  Therefore in order to evaluate the 
potential effectiveness of the Department of Defense 
Homeland Security Support Organization, an analysis of its 
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core organizational components and assessment of their 
congruence will be made in the following section. 
2. Analysis of the Department of Defense Core 
Homeland Security Support Organization 
As the complete Department of Defense Homeland 
Security Support Organization is not yet fully developed, 
it is assumed that the core organization, as depicted in 
Figure 3, will be adequate in predicting the behavior of 
the complete support organization.  As discussed in the 
previous section, this assumption is based on the belief 
that this initial design provides the core foundation for 
the complete Department of Defense’s Homeland Security 
support organization, and therefore should serve as an 
adequate model for predicting future organizational 
behavior. In order to analyze the components of the 
Department of Defense’s core Homeland Security Support 
organization and to evaluate its congruence, Roberts’ 
Organizational System Framework (OSF) Model will be 
utilized. 
Roberts’ OSF model was derived from, among other 
concepts, the basic Inputs, Processes, and Outputs (IPO) 
model [Ref. 21](see Figure 4) and Nadler and Tushman’s 
congruence theory of organizations.  It analyzes the 
components of an organization (its inputs, throughput, and 
results) and assesses their congruence in order to measure 
overall organizational effectiveness [Ref. 22] (see Figure 
5).  A key underlying factor of the OSF model is that 
organizations possess a greater ability to control factors 
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Figure 5.   Roberts’ Organizational Systems 
Framework Model [From Ref. 22] 
 
Factors within the throughput component of the OSF 
model are called the design factors of the organization, 
and include: the organization’s tasks and jobs, technology 
or activity workflow, structure, people, and process and 
subsystems including financial management, human resource 
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management, and communication and information systems.  
Again, because the Department of Defense Homeland Security 
Support Organization is not yet fully developed, all of 
these design factors are not provided for in this analysis.  
The Department of Defense’s core Homeland Security Support 
organization does, however, provide a good basic 
“structure” in which to perform an analysis.  Therefore, in 
assessing the potential effectiveness of the Department of 
Defense Homeland Security Support Organization, the 
structure of the core organization will be analyzed and an 
evaluation will be made on its congruence with the inputs 
and results of the organization. 
Figure 6 depicts the OSF model framework as applied to 
this analysis.  According to the model, inputs to the 
organization flow into the throughput where they are 
transformed into results that flow out of the organization.  
In order for the inputs to produce the desired results, the 
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Figure 6.   Department of Defense Core Homeland 
Security Support Organizational System Framework 
[After Refs. 20, 21 and 23] 
 
a. Component Analysis 
(1) Inputs.  The Inputs provide the 
organization with its purpose or mandate, strategic 
direction, and includes any associated strategic issues.  
The mandate for the Department of Defense Homeland Security 
Support organization is derived primarily from the 2002 
National Defense Authorization Act, which directed the 
Department of Defense to develop beneficial organization 
structures for supporting U.S. Homeland Security.  Its 
strategic direction comes from the U.S. Homeland Security 
Strategy and the proposed Department of Homeland Security 
objectives, as well as from the associated issues and 
implications.  As discussed in Chapter II, the primary 
strategic objective of U.S. Homeland Security is to prevent 
terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce 
America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and to minimize the 
damage and recover from attacks that do occur.  The focus 
of this strategy is in six critical mission areas: 
Intelligence and Warning, Border and Transportation 
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Security, Domestic Counter terrorism, Protection of 
Critical Infrastructure and key assets, Defending against 
Catastrophic Threats, and Emergency Preparedness and 
Response. 
The current strategic issues include: How to 
centralize budgeting issues related to homeland security 
(to prevent duplication of missions and budgets), How to 
better integrate intelligence with law enforcement, How to 
develop supporting organizations, and How to identify and 
define relationships with key organizations. 
(2) Throughput/Transformational process.   
The Throughput is the mechanism that 
transforms inputs into results.  It is comprised of all the 
organization design factors including tasks and jobs, 
technology, structure, people, and process and subsystems.  
Again due to the current incomplete design of Department of 
Defense’s Homeland Security Support Organization, only the 
“structure” will be analyzed and assessed under the 
throughput section of this model. Structures are typically 
viewed as ends unto themselves, however under the systems 
view of organizations, structure is the means in which to 
achieve the desired ends.  Therefore, structural design can 
be the most critical factor in developing organizations, 
particularly for organizations seeking transformation. 
As described in the previous section and as 
depicted in Figure 3, the Department of Defense’s core 
Homeland Security support structure, typical of most 
military structures, is a centralized hierarchy.  However, 
policy and planning is coordinated across internal 
organizations within the Department of Defense Homeland 
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Security support structure, as well as between the 
Department of Defense and the proposed Department of 
Homeland Security.  This cross-coordination implicitly 
flattens the structure somewhat enabling greater 
flexibility and responsiveness as opposed to a rigid 
functionally coordinated structure.  The JTF organization 
performs the integrative function by providing Emergency 
Preparedness and Response and Border and Transportation 
Security support directly to the Department of Homeland 
Security.  They are the primary implementers of the 
Department of Defense’s Homeland Security Support mission, 
serving as the front-line coordinators for military 
support.  Key to this support is the intra-agency 
coordination that exists between the proposed Department of 
Defense Offices of Homeland Defense Policy and Intelligence 
and USNORTHCOM.  Key external coordination exists between 
both the proposed new Department of Defense Offices and the 
proposed Department of Homeland Security. 
(3) Results.  Since the Department of 
Homeland Security has not yet been approved, the results of 
the new organization and U.S. Homeland Security Strategy 
cannot yet be measured.  Therefore at this stage results 
can be viewed as the consequences of strategy that flow 
from the transformation process.  In this model, the 
consequences for pursuing the intended strategy ultimately 
have implications on organizational design.  These 
implications include the need to design organizations that 
foster partnerships and shared relationships, operational 
efficiency, accountability, flexibility, and 
responsiveness. 
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The potential effectiveness of the 
Department of Defense Homeland Security Support 
organization can be assessed based on determining 
congruence or alignment between the inputs (the U.S. 
Homeland Security Strategy, proposed Department of Homeland 
Security Organization, and their associated strategic 
issues, strengths, weaknesses, and implications), the 
throughput (the Department of Defense’s core Homeland 
Security Support structure), and the results (how well it 
facilitates partnerships and shared relationships, 
operational efficiency, accountability, flexibility, and 
responsiveness).  In the following section an assessment 
will be made on the congruence between the inputs, 
throughput, and results of the Department of Defense’s core 
Homeland Security Support Organization.  The terms that 
will be used to characterize the level of congruence 
between components are “weak”, “average”, and “strong”. 
b. Congruence Assessment 
(1) Congruence between Inputs and 
Throughput.  First, in evaluating congruence between inputs 
and the throughput, an assessment can be made based on how 
well the core Department of Defense structure addresses the 
strategic issues, strengths and weaknesses, and 
implications of the U.S. Homeland Security Strategy and 
proposed Department of Homeland Security objectives. 
Strategic Issues 
In addressing strategic issues, the first 
issue derived from the U.S. Homeland Security Strategy 
analysis was the concern over budget or mission 
duplication.  By making the distinction between homeland 
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defense and homeland security, the Secretary of Defense 
provided an effective initial guideline for distinguishing 
missions and funding related to homeland security and 
homeland defense. 
The second issue concerning the need for 
improving the integration of intelligence with law 
enforcement was effectively addressed through the proposal 
for creation of the Department of Defense Office of 
Intelligence.  In addressing this issue the proposed new 
office would consolidate military intelligence and provide 
for coordination of intelligence information directly with 
the Department of Homeland Security. 
The third and fourth issues concerned the 
need for identifying, establishing, and defining 
relationships with key organizations, and developing 
support organizations.  The Department of Defense 
effectively addressed this issue by developing its core 
Homeland Security Support structure and initial policy 
guidelines for supporting the Department of Homeland 
Security. 
Therefore, the Department of Defense’s core 
Homeland Security Support structure (throughput) provides a 
fairly “strong” level of congruence in addressing the 
strategic issues of the U.S. Homeland Security Strategy and 
the proposed Department of Homeland Security objectives 
(input). 
Strengths 
In assessing alignment with the strengths of 
the proposed Department of Homeland Security Organization, 
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the Department of Defense’s core Homeland Security 
structure provides: 
1) Unity of command in its organization 
structure with the appointment of USNORTHCOM as the 
military command responsible for U.S. Homeland Defense. 
2) Visibility and connectivity between 
activities, as depicted in Figure 3. 
3) A framework for assimilating and 
synthesizing homeland security – related intelligence with 
the proposed creation of the Department of Defense Office 
of Intelligence. 
4) A framework for Congressional oversight 
of homeland security-related programs and costs.  The 
Department of Defense’s Planning, Programming, and 
Budgeting System (PPBS) would provide the capability for 
capturing homeland security - related programming, 
budgeting and cost information. 
5) A single public voice for communicating 
homeland security matters from the Department of Defense, 
with the Secretary of Defense and through the proposed 
Office of Homeland Defense within the Department of 
Defense. 
6) Uniformity, cooperation, and 
organizational synergy through consolidation and 
integration of programs.  This occurs again through the 
establishment of USNORTHCOM.  Complete support organization 
design should also address the consolidation and 
integration efforts within each of the Department of 
Defense services (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps). 
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7) Clear responsibility for the management 
and utilization of Defense resources for crisis management 
and response.  This is specifically accomplished through 
the JTF organization. 
8) A single point of contact for state, 
local, and private sector.  Again current Department of 
Defense policy requires the coordination with external 
agencies only through the Department of Defense or through 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense organization. 
9) A solid organizational foundation in 
which to develop unifying plans, guidelines, and strategy. 
Therefore, the Department of Defense’s core 
Homeland Security Support structure (throughput) provides a 
fairly “strong” level of congruence in assessing alignment 
with the strengths of the proposed Department of Homeland 
Security (input). 
Weaknesses 
In addressing the two key weaknesses 
identified in the proposed Department of Homeland Security, 
the core Homeland Security structure, 1) provides a good 
initial support organization for supporting the Department 
of Homeland Security, and 2) establishes initial policy and 
guidelines for defining its relationship with the 
Department of Homeland Defense.  However, the role of the 
National Guard under USNORTHCOM needs to be further 
clarified and defined. 
Therefore, the Department of Defense’s core 
Homeland Security Support structure (throughput) provides 
an “average” level of congruence in addressing the 
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weaknesses of the proposed Department of Homeland Security 
(input). 
Key Implications 
In addressing the key implications of the 
proposed Department of Homeland Security Organization, four 
proposed changes could potentially impact the Department of 
Defense. 
First, the current Department of Homeland 
Security proposal calls for transfer of the Coast Guard 
from the Department of Transportation to the Department of 
Homeland Security.  The Navy and JTF-6 organizations 
currently provide counter-drug operations support to the 
Coast Guard under the traditional defense mission.  
However, upon transfer of the Coast Guard to the Department 
of Homeland Security, determination will need to be made on 
whether or not counter drug operations support will 
continue to fall under traditional defense, or under the 
category of homeland security, as distinguished by the 
Secretary of Defense.  This is still undetermined, nor is 
it addressed in the Department of Defense’s core Homeland 
Security Support Organization.  However, until this 
determination is made, JTF-6 under the core structure will 
remain aligned with supporting the Department of Homeland 
Security’s Border and Transportation mission. 
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Second, the current proposal also calls for 
the transfer of the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) to the Department of Homeland Security.  The JTF-CS 
organization currently provides Emergency Preparedness and 
Response – related support to FEMA. Under the Department of 
Defense’s Homeland Security Support organization, JTF-CS 
will simply realign itself with the Department of Homeland 
Security in supporting its Emergency Preparedness and 
Response mission.  The current Department of Defense 
Homeland Security policy also envisions JTF-CS as the agent 
for providing coordination for all military activities 
related support. 
Third, the current proposal calls for the 
consolidation of all Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 
and Nuclear Countermeasure activities under the Department 
of Homeland Security.  The primary implication for this is 
that the Department of Defense has included in the 
President’s FY03 budget a $420 million proposal for the 
development of a National Bioweapons Defense Analysis 
Center.  This funding would simply be transferred to the 
Department of Homeland Security if the center is approved. 
Last, the current proposal calls for the 
transfer of the National Communications System, which the 
Department of Defense currently manages, to the Department 
of Homeland Security.  According to Secretary Rumsfeld’s 
May 7, 2002, testimony, this transfer could be accomplished 
with only minimal impact to the Department of Defense [Ref 
2]. 
Therefore, the Department of Defense’s core 
Homeland Security Support structure (throughput) provides 
an “average” to “strong” level of congruence in addressing 
the key implications of the proposed Department of Homeland 
Security Organization (input). 
(2) Congruence between Results and 
Throughput.  In its analysis of the U.S. Homeland Security 
Strategy, the ANSER Institute for Homeland Security 
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developed the four themes of Federalism, Accountability, 
Fiscal Responsibility, and Prioritization of Effort, which 
are the consequential results or goals of pursuing the U.S. 
Homeland Security Strategy.  The implications of these 
themes are that partnerships and shared relationships, 
operational efficiency, accountability, flexibility, and 
responsiveness must be built into the design of homeland 
security organizations.  Therefore, in evaluating 
congruence between results and the throughput, an 
assessment can be made based on how well the core 
Department of Defense structure facilitates partnerships 
and shared relationships, operational efficiency, 
accountability, flexibility, and responsiveness. 
Partnerships and Shared Relationships 
Under the concept of Federalism, the 
Department of Defense’s structure should be designed with 
the ability to establish shared relationships with other 
organizations supporting U.S. homeland security, and should 
be designed to achieve operational efficiency through 
consolidation.  The Department of Defense’s core Homeland 
Security Support structure is consistent with both of these 
through its USNORTHCOM organization (consolidation of 
homeland security functions) and JTF organization 
(facilitation of shared, cooperative arrangement).  The 
proposed creation of the Department of Defense Office of 
Intelligence also is consistent with the creation of 
structures that facilitate sharing and partnership. 
Accountability 
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Under the concept of Accountability, the 
Department of Defense’s structure should be designed with 
the ability to measure and show results, and to hold 
individuals responsible for these results.  The U.S. 
military has always sought to hold its people and 
organizations responsible for their actions, but measuring 
results and performance has historically been a challenge.  
The Department of Defense currently utilizes the Planning, 
Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) as a means to 
measure resource performance.  However, identifying and 
defining metrics for homeland security – related results 
and performance is an area that will require further 
development.  Other organizations as well will more than 
likely find it difficult to specify and define homeland 
security – related performance metrics. 
Operational Efficiency 
Under the Concept of Fiscal Responsibility 
the Department of Defense’s structure should be designed 
with a focus towards avoiding duplication of effort and 
building additional capabilities where they may already 
exist.  Again this is consistent with the realignment of 
USNORTHCOM and the consolidation of U.S. homeland security 
functions across the Unified Command Structure. 
Under the concept of Prioritization of 
effort, the Department of Defense’s structure should be 
designed with the ability to prioritize homeland security 
support efforts through a single channel.  This too is 
accomplished through the establishment of USNORTHCOM. 
Flexibility and Responsiveness 
The net result of these four themes is the 
need to also create homeland security organizations that 
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will be responsive to rapid change and therefore capable of 
effectively managing U.S. homeland security efforts.  Pete 
Verga, special assistant to the Secretary of Defense for 
Homeland Security and Homeland Security Task Force 
Director, equated the proposed Department of Homeland 
Security to the Secretary of Defense’s initiative to 
transform the military from threat-based planning to 
capabilities-based planning.  As Verga states, “this gives 
you a greater ability to respond regardless of what the 
threat is…if you have a set of capabilities that you can 
apply regardless of the threat, you end up with a much more 
flexible response.” [Ref. 23] Therefore as Verga points out 
flexibility and responsiveness are key results and factors 
that must also be incorporated into the design of 
transformational organizations.  In aligning its structure 
to incorporate partnerships and shared relationships, 
operational efficiency, and accountability, the Department 
of Defense core Homeland Security Support structure 
therefore also achieves flexibility and responsiveness in 
its design. 
Therefore, the Department of Defense’s core 
Homeland Security Support structure (throughput) provides 
an “average” to “strong” level of congruence in assessing 
how well it facilitates partnerships and shared 
relationships, operational efficiency, accountability, 
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IV. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
The U.S. Homeland Security Strategy and proposed 
Department of Homeland Security provides the ‘road map’ for 
U.S. Homeland Security Strategy implementation.  Key among 
the requirements for successful implementation, as 
identified through analysis of these documents, is the need 
for the federal government to develop partnerships and 
shared relationships with all affected federal, state, 
local and private U.S. institutions. 
The Department of Defense, referred to as the new 
Department of Homeland Security’s “closest cousin” by the 
ANSER Institute for Homeland Security [Ref. 15], could 
potentially have the greatest impact on U.S. Homeland 
Security Strategy achievement.  As a result of the 2002 
National Defense Authorization Act, the Department of 
Defense began establishing an internal organizational for 
supporting U.S. Homeland Security efforts.  Beginning 
primarily with the realignment of the Unified Military 
Command Structure in April 2002, the Unified Command Plan 
2002 (UCP02) established the U. S. Northern Command as the 
unified combatant command singularly responsible for U.S. 
Homeland Defense and Homeland Security support.  The 
Department of Defense also proposed creation of two new 
internal offices, the Office of Homeland Defense Policy and 
the Office of Intelligence, as well as developed its 
initial policy to guide the Department’s homeland defense 
and homeland security support efforts. 
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As a result of the criticality of the Department of 
Defense Homeland Security support efforts to U.S. Homeland 
Security Strategy achievement, this thesis sought to answer 
this primary question:  Will the Department of Defense 
Homeland Security Support Organization be effective in 
supporting the U.S. Homeland Security Strategy and 
objectives of the Department of Homeland Security? And 
secondarily, if determined to be effective, can the 
organization be modeled and applied to assist other U.S. 
institutions in aiding U.S. Homeland Security Strategy 
implementation. 
In order to answer these questions an analysis of the 
current Department of Defense Homeland Security 
organization was conducted using Roberts’ Organizational 
Systems Framework Model and Nadler and Tushman’s congruence 
theory.  These models were utilized based on their ability 
to evaluate organization effectiveness by relating 
organizational inputs and design to strategy, which is 
particularly important for implementing U.S. Homeland 
Security Strategy.  While the complete Department of 
Defense Homeland Security Support Organization is not yet 
fully developed, my analysis assumed that the core 
organization, as depicted in Figure 3, would be adequate 
for predicting the behavior of the complete support 
organization.  Therefore, based on my research and 
analysis, the following conclusion is made: 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
Overall the Department of Defense’s Core Homeland 
Security Support Organization achieves a “fairly strong” 
level of congruence between its inputs, throughput, and 
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results.  Therefore based on this core organizational 
structure, it is predicted that the complete Department of 
Defense Homeland Security Support Organization will be 
effective in supporting the U.S. Homeland Security Strategy 
and the new Department of Homeland Security. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
It is recommended that further research be conducted 
in those areas where congruence could not be fully 
evaluated as a result of incomplete information on the core 
Department of Defense Homeland Security Support structure.  
These areas include: 1) functional integration and 
consolidation efforts within the Department of Defense 
services (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps); 2) the 
role of the National Guard under USNORTHCOM; 3) the role of 
the Navy and JTF-6 in counter drug operations as a result 
of the transfer of the Coast Guard to the Department of 
Homeland Security; and 4) how to define and measure 
homeland security – related performance metrics. 
Further research is also recommended on analyzing the 
remaining design factors (tasks and jobs, technology or 
activity workflow, people, and process and subsystems 
including financial management, human resource management, 
and communication and information systems) that will be 
provided for once the complete Department of Defense 
Homeland Security Support Organization is fully developed. 
Under the systems approach, organizations are viewed 
as both dynamic and evolving.  As President Bush stated in 
his opening letter of the U.S. Strategy for Homeland 
Security, the Strategy is just the beginning and will be an 
evolutionary and dynamic process. 
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Therefore, the systems designed to employ the U.S. 
Homeland Security Strategy, which includes both the 
Department of Homeland Security and its support 
organizations, must also be evolving and capable of 
adapting to an evolving strategy.  This is the very essence 
of transformation, and why organizations, as Peter Verga 
states, must be designed to achieve both flexibility and 
responsiveness.  In adapting evolving strategy to 
organizations, a model must be adopted that enables 
continuous feedback from the results to the inputs and 
transformation process.  A good model to use for this is 
the Cybernetic Feedback Model (CFM) [Ref. 21]. 










It expands upon the basic IPO model (Figure 4) and is 
structurally similar to Roberts’ OSF model (Figure 5).  The 
primary difference is that the CFM contains feedback loops 
which enable the results to flow back to both the inputs as 
well as to the process.  Figure 8 below depicts the 
application of this model to the Department of Defense 
Homeland Security Support Organization. 
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Figure 8.   Department of Defense Homeland Security 
Support System Transformational Feedback Model 
[After Refs. 20, 21 and 23] 
 
In applying this model to the Department of Defense 
Homeland Security Support Organization the results or 
consequences of the strategy, which are partnerships and 
shared relationships, operational efficiency, 
accountability, flexibility, and responsiveness, flow back 
to the transformation process in order to be incorporated 
into the design of the internal organization.  The results 
also flow back to the inputs in order to ensure the 
organizational direction is current and properly aligned 
with the rest of the organization. 
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Using this approach produces a system or organization 
that is capable of continual transformation, which for an 
evolving and dynamic process such as U.S. Homeland Security 
is essential.  Applying this model also enables 
organizations to perform continual diagnosis to ensure that 
their inputs, throughputs, and results remain congruent. 
Therefore, in answering the secondary research 
question: Can the organization be modeled and applied to 
assist other U.S. institutions in aiding U.S. Homeland 
Security Strategy implementation, it is recommended that 
the Department of Defense Homeland Security Support System 
Transformational Feedback Model (Figure 8) be adopted to 
develop new organizations for supporting the Department of 
Homeland Security.  It is additionally recommended that 
this model be utilized to diagnose organizations in order 
to ensure that they remain congruent with the U.S. Homeland 
Security Strategy. 
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